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LEONARD V. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.:
WHY THE HIGH WATER MARK IN THE TORT-CONTRACT
DEBATE MAY CAUSE THE NEXT WAVE OF INSURANCE
LITIGATION TO INUNDATE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS WITH THEIR TORT CLAIMS
Jeffrey E. McDonald*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast on August 29,
2005, bringing with it a swath of utter destruction, laying waste to a coastal
region stretching nearly two hundred miles. "In the hours and days follow-
ing Hurricane Katrina, the federal government declared widespread areas
of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama as federal disaster zones."' In the
wake of its one hundred-plus mile per hour winds, and fifteen-plus foot
storm surge, lay the ruins of homes, lives, cities and towns from Grand Isle,
Louisiana, to the drowned city of New Orleans, and finally through the
washed out coastal Mississippi towns of Pascagoula, Biloxi, and Pass Chris-
tian. Even Bay St. Louis, the highest point on the Mississippi Gulf Coast,
was inundated by a nearly thirty foot storm surge.2
Although the physical destruction and emotional ruin of the communi-
ties along the Gulf of Mexico has long since receded into our nation's col-
lective memory, for the hundreds of thousands of lives directly affected by
Katrina, a recitation of the devastation wrought by the storm would be in
itself tortious. The memories of what once was, what was lost, and what is
left have been permanently seared into our souls. Likewise, the memory of
Katrina is (not quite as) equally painful for the private insurance industry.
Estimates of the damages left in the wake of Katrina predict total potential
economic losses which could exceed one hundred billion dollars.' The
storm rocked the boats of private insurance companies, where industry
losses are estimated between forty and sixty billion dollars, making it the
costliest catastrophe ever to occur in the United States.'
* The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Michael McCann for his guidance throughout
the drafting of this note. His insight, expertise, and enthusiasm contributed greatly to my growth as a
student, research assistant, and author. I am also grateful to my family for their perpetual support and
encouragement. Finally, thanks to Andy and Sharon for giving this Katrina refugee a home in the
months after the storm.
1. Wilson Elsner Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker L.L.P., Article, Katrina Spawns Storm Over
Insurance (2005), http://www.Wilsonelser.com/files/repository/KatrinaAlert2_Oct2005.pdf.
2. Margaret H. Clune, Time for a New Look at "Windfalls for Wipeouts"?, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Spring 2006, at 64.
3. Wilson Elser, supra note 1.
4. Posting of Tara to The Injury Lawyer Blog, http://www.the-injury-lawyer-directory.com/2006/
06/post-katrina-insurance-still-issue.html (June 7, 2006, 08:05 EST).
203
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Hurricane Katrina achieved the distinction of 'the costliest natural dis-
aster in U.S. history' primarily due to the catastrophic effects of wind-
driven water.' Three of Mississippi's southern counties directly abut the
shallow fringes of the Gulf of Mexico.6 With no manmade barriers to sepa-
rate them from the immense storm surges which moved ashore, the pri-
mary wave of litigation has predominantly disputed issues of policy
coverage,' including increased debate over the language and meaning of
policy terms and exclusions. Unfortunately for many Mississippi plaintiffs,
the terms of insurance policies are generally held to be unambiguous in
nature. Thus, such claims will continue to be expediently dismissed, avoid-
ing-to use an (in)appropriate, if not ironic, term of art-"a flood of
litigation."
Nevertheless, there rises a growing wave of claims which are, some-
times in part and occasionally unintentionally, based on theories of negli-
gence, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (where statute
permits) on the part of insurance agents. Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. represents the calm before the storm of such "agency" cases.
While cases in this category are developing slowly, the flood of negligence
actions will likely breach the pleading and evidentiary barriers which cur-
rently preclude recovery.
Leonard illuminates the glaring problem of finding judicial relief for
claims on the fringes of tort and contract theory. Moreover, Leonard
points out the faulty logic which drives the judicial system to decide such
cases under the guise of certainty, for lack of ambiguity, utilizing contract
theory. In Leonard, this inherent preference, due in part to the gray area
between tort and contract theory and the uncertainty of remedy and recov-
ery in tort claims, clouds the courts' factual analysis. Consequently, the
Leonards were denied any recovery, despite the existence and (an admit-
tedly poor) presentation of reasonable tort claims.
The instant case and similarly styled litigation will ultimately compel
the courts to evaluate and re-evaluate the collision of contract and tort
theory in light of Hurricane Katrina, while considering the future implica-
tions for the insurance industry and the National Flood Insurance Program
(hereinafter "NFIP"). These cases will also demand that the courts revisit
the principles of agency and the duties, standard of care, and liability re-
garding insurance agents and their principals. The welfare of citizens who
rely upon those services to protect their homes and families must outweigh
the interests of private insurers.
Section II of this Note follows immediately and contains a summary of
the facts and procedural history of Leonard. Section III includes discussion
of the relevant law and legal principles addressed by the courts, and the
analysis within this Note. Section IV details the peculiar motivation and
5. Insurance Litigation Reporter, 29 No 16 INSLITREP 634 (9/20/07).
6. John P. Manard, Jr., Patrick O'Hara & Kelly R. Blackwood, Katrina's Tort Litigation: An
Imperfect Storm, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 2006, at 31.
7. Id.
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strategy of this appeal, brought by the defendant from a favorable lower
court decision.' Concluding Section IV is a presentation of the opinion,
analysis, and rationale of the Fifth Circuit Court regarding the findings of
the lower courts and its disposition on appeal. Finally, Section V explores
the significance the Circuit Court's uncertainty as to whether or not Leo-
nard was proceeding under contract or tort theory.9
The analysis goes on to examine the case under tort theory, followed
by discussions of the significance of the factual and evidentiary rulings of
Leonard, the future implications for insurance litigation in federal courts,
and the conflict in the resolution of claims which are colorable under either
contract or tort principles.
II. FACTS
A. Factual Summary
Leonard commenced with a civil action brought by Paul and Julie Leo-
nard (hereinafter "Leonard" or "the Leonards") against Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Nationwide"), and their agent, Jay
Fletcher (hereinafter "Fletcher"). The relevant facts include a discussion
of the policy language,10 the specific request for advice regarding the
purchase of an NFIP policy, knowledge that Nationwide agent Jay Fletcher
should have had, and likely should have imparted to the Leonards regard-
ing hurricane coverage."
For this analysis, the vital facts concern the inquiry by Leonard,
Fletcher's statements in response to the inquiry, the manner in which his
opinion was formed, the materiality of his statements, the eighteen year
relationship between Leonard and Fletcher,12 and the alleged misrepresen-
tations made by Fletcher to Leonard (and others) regarding the need to
purchase additional hurricane insurance.' 3 Most significant, however, is
Leonard's (reasonable?) reliance upon representations made by Fletcher in
his capacity as an insurance agent and the consequences of such reliance.' 4
Leonard's home lies twelve feet above sea level in the southernmost
region of Pascagoula, Mississippi, less than two hundred yards from the
Mississippi Sound.'" Leonard first purchased a homeowner's policy from
Nationwide's Pascagoula-area agent, Fletcher, in 1989.16 Leonard testified
8. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 691 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
9. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co, 499 F.3d 419, 439 (5th Cir. 2007).
10. When Leonard renewed their policy, they received this notice: "Your policy does not cover
flood loss. You can get protection through the National Flood Insurance Program. If you wish to find
out more about this protection, please contact your Nationwide agent." Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425.
11. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 691. ("Fletcher was authorized by Nationwide to interpret and
explain all the coverages provided under Nationwide's policies.")
12. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425.
13. Id. at 426.
14. Id. at 425.
15. Id. at 423.
16. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425.
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that when he first bought the policy, he asked Fletcher whether the Nation-
wide policy covered hurricane-related losses.17  According to Leonard,
Fletcher responded that all hurricane damage was covered, though Fletcher
denied any memory of this conversation in his deposition." Leonard
claimed that he called Fletcher ten years later after seeing advertisements
for additional NFIP'9 coverage following the 1998 landfall of Hurricane
Georges along the Mississippi coast.2 0 Fletcher allegedly assured Leonard
that he did not need to purchase the supplemental NFIP policy because he
did not live in an area classified "Zone A"2 1 for flood risk by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (hereinafter "FEMA"), even assuring
Leonard by offering that his own property was not insured under the
NFIP. 22
When Hurricane Katrina struck, it battered Pascagoula with torrential
rain and sustained winds in excess of one hundred miles per hour, and "By
midday, the storm had driven ashore a formidable tidal wave . . . that
flooded the ground floor of the Leonard's two-story home." 23 Leonard's
neighborhood suffered a seventeen-foot storm surge, causing their home to
be inundated by five feet of water, and extensively damaging the walls,
floors, fixtures, and personal property inside the first floor of the house.24
From the testimony of witnesses, including Fletcher's assistant, it was
clear that Fletcher sometimes discouraged his clients from purchasing flood
insurance policies.2 5 The district court admitted as evidence that Fletcher,
"as a matter of habit and routine, expressed his opinion ... that customers
[in Pascagoula] should not purchase flood insurance unless they lived in a
flood prone area (Flood Zone A) where flood insurance was required in
connection with mortgage loans."26 Further, trial evidence demonstrated
that between 2001 and Katrina's landfall in 2005, Fletcher sold one hun-
dred eighty-seven NIFP policies to Pascagoula residents, twelve of whom
lived in Leonard's waterfront neighborhood.2 7
17. Id.
18. Id. (The district court deemed this testimony irrelevant to the case.)
19. The National Flood Insurance Program provides supplemental flood insurance policies. Al-
though these policies are sold by independent insurers, they are funded by the federal government.
These policies are distinct from any other type of property insurance policy sold by private insurance
companies. NFIP policies have independent price rates, contracts, and claim handling procedures, and
are in no way construed to be included in a private homeowner's policy, or any type of coverage pro-
vided by the insurer.
20. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425.
21. Areas most prone to flooding are designated Floodzone A, those less susceptible are desig-
nated Floodzone B, and those even less, Floodzone C. NIFP coverage is available to anyone, regardless
of which zone in which they are situated .
22. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425. (Here, Fletcher may implicitly admit that Leonard's inquiry was
regarding additional flood insurance provided by the NIFP and thus not on which could be construed as
an iquiry concerning his existing policy.)
23. Id. at 423-24.
24. Id. at 426.
25. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
26. Id.
27. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425.
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Nationwide is among the privately-owned insurers who are qualified
to write and sell supplemental NIFP coverage.2 8 Fletcher would have
earned a fifteen percent commission on the sale of such flood insurance
policies.29 Moreover, Fletcher was expressly authorized by Nationwide to
interpret and explain the coverage provided under all policies sold by Na-
tionwide, and Nationwide consistently informed policy holders that they
should direct all questions concerning their coverage to the local agent, in
this case, Fletcher."o
Leonard made his inquiry to Fletcher seeking advice as to whether it
would be advisable for him (Leonard) to purchase a flood insurance policy,
and when Fletcher ventured his opinion that such a policy was not neces-
sary, Leonard refrained from buying a flood policy.3 1 "There was no dis-
cussion of the reason Fletcher did not believe Leonard needed to buy a
flood insurance policy," and Leonard inferred that Fletcher's advice meant
that his existing policy would cover water damage from a hurricane.3 2 The
District Court also noted the absence of testimony establishing a standard
of care for insurance agents applicable to an insurance agent who is asked
about the advisability of purchasing flood insurance3 3 or an established
standard of care for the training of agents who are authorized to sell and
interpret such policies.3 4
B. Procedural History
Paul and Julie Leonard brought suit against the provider of their
homeowners' insurance policy, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
(hereinafter "Nationwide") to recover for damage to their residence
caused by wind damage and storm surge from Hurricane Katrina.3 5 The
suit commenced in the Chancery Court of Jackson County, Mississippi,
with the Leonard's local insurance agent, Jay Fletcher as a named defen-
dant.3 6 Nationwide removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi, and all claims against Fletcher were
dismissed." Leonard facilitated the removal by filing a motion to dismiss
Fletcher without prejudice noting that Leonard "clearly stated viable
claims against the in-state agent" for misrepresentation." The motion also





33. See infra notes 73-76. (This issue is well settled in Mississippi case law.)
34. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 692. (See Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Re-
form Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-264, § 1(a), 118 Stat. 712 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4011
(2006)).) (These standards were to be set by FEMA's congressional mandate to create a training pro-
gram for agents authorized to sell NFIP policies, however the program had not been implemented at
the time of the storm.)
35. Leonard, 499 F.3d 423.
36. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
37. Id.
38. Motion to Dismiss Defendant Jay Fletcher Insurance at 1 3, Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (C.A. No. 1:05CV475LG-RHW), 2005 WL 3939529.
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declared that Leonard would not resist removal specifically due to "Missis-
sippi statutory and common law binding Nationwide to the misrepresenta-
tions of its agent."39
Following bench trial, Senior District Judge Senter's findings included
the fact that Fletcher did not breach any standard of care owed to Leonard
by advising of his opinion that they did not need flood insurance, and that
Fletcher's statements did not, in fact, constitute negligent misrepresenta-
tion.4 0 The court also found that "Fletcher sometimes discouraged his cli-
ents from purchasing flood insurance policies," and found sufficient
evidence to warrant that Fletcher "as a matter of habit and routine, ex-
pressed his opinion . . . that customers should not purchase flood
insurance."41
In its ruling as to damages, the district court held that some of Leo-
nard's claims were included under the policy, while others were excluded.42
The remaining claims were dismissed on August 15, 2006.43 Leonard's re-
covery included only damages covered by his homeowner's policy, merely
the damages which were found to have been the result of high winds.44 The
damages amounted to just over two hundred and thirty dollars for broken
windows and just under one thousand dollars for pressure-washing the half
of the house which had remained above the water line.45
Interestingly, Nationwide then appealed the decision of the district
court.4 6 Nationwide also moved in limine to exclude evidence of Fletcher's
statements to policyholder's other than Leonard, and the motion was car-
ried with the appeal." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Nation-
wide's motion regarding Fletcher's oral statements.4 8 Furthermore, the
circuit court affirmed the lower court's finding that Fletcher did not materi-
ally misrepresent policy terms.4 9 Additionally, the circuit court upheld the
lower court's holding that Fletcher's alleged misrepresentations did not
support a negligent misrepresentation claim."o The analysis and ultimate
holding of the Fifth Circuit holdings were supported only by the statutory
code and case law of the State of Mississippi, or prior interpretation of such
by the circuit court, and rely primarily on contract law analysis.
39. Id.
40. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
41. Id. at 690.
42. Id. at 696.
43. See Leonard, 499 F.3d 419.
44. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
45. Id.
46. Leonard, 499 F.3d 419 at 427. (Leonard withdrew a cross-appeal.)
47. Id. at 426.
48. Id.
49. Id. (However, relevant to this analysis is not whether Fletcher misrepresented terms of the
policy, or "orally modified or altered" the terms of the policy, but rather whether representations made
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Jurisdiction
The circuit court exercised appellate jurisdiction over Nationwide's ap-
peal pursuant to Title 28, Article 1291 of the United States Code,"' despite
Leonard's contention that the appeal should be dismissed for "mootness
and lack of standing."5 2 The circuit court recognized Nationwide's right to
appeal any adverse judgment redressable on appeal, notwithstanding the
fact that the original ruling was generally favorable. Furthermore, the
circuit court held that Nationwide was an "aggrieved party" with respect to
the district court's holdings regarding certain policy language and the negli-
gent misrepresentation issue, and consequently entitled to this appeal.5 4
B. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing a district court's determination of Missis-
sippi Law is de novo.5 The factual findings of the lower court, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall be preserved unless clearly
erroneous.56 The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a finding of fact
is clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made."" Additionally, the Circuit Court reviews eviden-
tiary rulings of the lower court for abuse of discretion." A trial court
abuses its discretion when its ruling regarding admissibility of evidence is
based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence. 9
C. The Interplay of Insurance, Contract and Agency Law
Where the language of an insurance contract is clear and unambigu-
ous, Mississippi courts give effect to the plain meaning of such policy lan-
guage.6 0 Nothing requires or permits the Mississippi courts "to make a
contract differing from that made by the parties themselves, or to enlarge
51. "The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,
the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
52. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 427.
53. Id. (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 at 345-46 (U.S. 1980)).
54. Id. at 428.
55. Welbourne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 685, 687 (5th Cir. 2007).
56. Reliable Home Health Care, Inc. v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
57. Estate of Taylor, 609 So. 2d 390, 393 (Miss. 1992) (quoting UHS-Qualicare Inc. v. Gulf Coast
Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987)).
58. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 429.
59. Bocanegra v. Vicmar Srvs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2007).
60. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 429 (citing Robley v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Miss., 935 So. 2d 990,
996 (Miss. 2006)).
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an insurance company's obligations where the provisions are clear."6 1 Nor
will a court resort to extrinsic evidence or rules of contract construction if
policy provisions are unambiguous.62
Under Mississippi law, the insured has an affirmative duty to read the
policy. 63 Further, a party's reliance on representations by an insurance
agent that contradict the policy is unreasonable.6 4 The relationship be-
tween insurance companies and their agents is controlled by agency law.65
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has held that the acts of an agent can
bind the principal insurer.6 6 Accordingly, the Court has declared it "well
settled that an insurer is liable for the acts of its agents within the scope of
the agent's actual or apparent authority.""
D. Apparent Authority and Actual Authority of the Agent
The actual authority of an agent binds the principal as to those powers,
duties, and activities an agent may exercise when he has been "in fact au-
thorized by the principal to act on their behalf." 68 Apparent authority cre-
ates a binding agent-principal relationship when the principal "has by
words or conduct held the alleged agent out as having"69 such authority
and is thereby estopped to deny it.70 The Supreme Court of Mississippi has
recognized a three part test to determine if apparent authority exists to
bind the principal.7 1 First, there must be an act or some conduct by the
principal indicating the agent's authority.72 Next, the Court examines the
reasonable reliance upon the act or conduct by a third party.73 Finally, a
detrimental change in position by the third party must result.74
E. Tort Liability
1. Duty and Standard of Care
Under Mississippi law, the legal standard governing the agent's duty of
care owed to the insured is well settled.75 An insurance agent must "use
that degree of diligence and care with reference thereto which a reasonably
61. Id. (quoting State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. of Columbus v. Glover, 176 So. 2d 256, 258 (Miss.
1965)).
62. Id. (citing Jackson v. Daley, 739 So. 2d 1031, 1041 (Miss. 1999)).
63. Id. at 438 (citing Smith v. Union Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 782, 788 (S.D. Miss.
2003).
64. Id. (citing Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F. 3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2003)).
65. Id. at 439 (citing Barhonovich v. Am. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 1991)).
66. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1180 (Miss. 1990).
67. Dixie Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan, 684 So. 2d 574, 583 (Miss. 1996).
68. McFarland v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 919 So. 2d 894, 902 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Cooley v.
Brawner, 881 So. 2d 300, 302 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)).
69. Patriot Commercial Leasing Co. v. Jerry Enis Motors, 928 So. 2d 856, 864 (Miss. 2006).
70. Id.




75. Jeffrey Jackson, Mississippi Insurance Law and Practice § 5:14 (2007).
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prudent [person] would exercise in the transaction of his own business."76
Consequently, an insurance agent who gives advice "concerning the cover-
ages an insured should purchase in circumstances where the advice is rea-
sonably relied upon by the prospective insured may incur liability if the
advice is the product of a failure on the part of the agent to exercise rea-
sonable care."" Finally, the Mississippi Supreme Court has expressly
adopted Restatement (2d) of Torts § 522 which states:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or em-
ployment, or in any other transaction which he has a pecuni-
ary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transaction is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss suffered by them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information if he fails to exercise reasonable care
or competence in obtaining or communicating
information."
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
To maintain a common law claim for misrepresentation, it must be
shown that the party making the representations did so "with actual knowl-
edge of their falsity, or without knowing whether they were true or false, or
under such circumstances that he ought to have known they were false.""
Modern day case law suggests that what is misrepresented or omitted must
concern a fact, not merely an opinion.s0 In addition, the claimant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the materiality of the misrepre-
sentation, the negligence or failure to exercise appropriate diligence or ex-
pertise, reasonable reliance, and proximate damages."
Recently, however, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi has allowed the testimony of an agent's opinion to
remain admissible in a negligence claim.82 The district court held that such
testimony was a question of industry standards, and admissible under the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence 701 and 704." Furthermore, in negligence
claims, lay opinion testimony concerning an ultimate fact has been held to
be proper so long as the matter testified on is within the witness's personal
knowledge and is helpful to the finder of fact in resolving the issue.8 4
76. Sec. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cox, 299 So. 2d 192, 194 (Miss. 1974).
77. Jimerson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2192655 (S.D. Miss. 2006) at *2.
78. Touche Ross v. Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315, 319 (Miss. 1987).
79. H. D. Sojourner & Co. v. Joseph, 191 So. 418, 421 (Miss. 1939).
80. Bank of Shaw, A Branch of the Grenada Bank v. Posey, 573 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990).
81. Berkline v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699, 702 (Miss. 1984).
82. United Am. Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 978 So. 2d 613, 633 (Miss. 2007).
83. Miss. R. Evid. 704 is entitled "Opinion on Ultimate Issue," and states that "testimony in the
form of opinion is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact."
84. Bower v. Bower, 758 So. 2d 405, 413 (Miss. 2000).
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3. Liability of the Agent
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that "parties who are foresee-
able recipients of a negligently prepared professional opinion and who det-
rimentally rely on that opinion in their business affairs may recover from
the person offering the opinion.""s Thus, although Fletcher was dismissed
from this action, he might be found liable under a claim brought in a state
court because under Mississippi law, an agent who commits a tort is liable
in both his representative capacity and in his individual capacity.86
4. Liability of the Principal
Title 83 Chapter 17 Section 1 of the Mississippi Code, which defines an
agent, was enacted "to prevent insurers from operating through third per-
sons and later denying responsibility for the acts of those persons."8 In
addition, the "power of an agent to bind his principal is not limited to the
authority actually conferred upon the agent, but the principal is bound if
the conduct of the principal is such that persons of reasonable prudence ...
dealing with the agent might rightfully believe the agent to have the power
he assumes to have."" Further, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
it has been held that a principal is responsible for the torts of its agent
committed within the scope of the agent's employment.89
And finally,
[a] principal, having clothed his agent with the semblance of
authority, will not be permitted, after others have been led
to act in reliance of the appearances thus produced, to deny,
to the prejudice of such others, what he has theretofore tac-
itly affirmed as to the agent's powers.o
Thus, by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel, the principal cannot dis-
claim liability for the actions of an agent when such actions have been ex-
pressly designated as within the scope of the agent's authority,91 nor when
those same actions have not been actually or constructively limited by the
principal.92
5. Demonstrating Evidence of Negligence
Under Mississippi law, a negligence action based on a discussion be-
tween an agent and a potential insured does not require expert testimony
85. Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So. 2d 1268, 1277 (Miss. 1991).
86. Am. Fire Prot., Inc. v. Lewis, 653 So. 2d 1387, 1391 (Miss. 1995).
87. McCann v. Gulf Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 574 So. 2d 654, 656 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Ford v. Lamar
Life Ins. Co., 513 So. 2d 880, 888 (Miss. 1987)).
88. McPherson v. McClendon, 221 So. 2d 75, 78 (Miss. 1969).
89. Hutton v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 909 So. 2d 87, 96 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Odier v. Sumrall, 353 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1978)).
90. McPherson, 221 So. 2d at 78 (quoting 2 C.J.S. Agency § 96(c)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 79.
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to establish the existence or breach of the standard of care.9 3 These mat-
ters are of a nature which a layman can understand based on common
sense and practical experience. 94 Notably, the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi has held that where an insurance agent bases his advice against
purchasing flood insurance on erroneous information, such evidence sup-
ports the finding of negligence by a jury.95
F. Negligence Per Se and/or Joint Negligence
The NFIP was projected to have 4.7 million policyholders in nearly
19,000 communities by 2005.96 The Federal Emergency Management Ad-
ministration "oversees" the NFIP with a mere forty FEMA employees and
under two hundred contractor employees.97 In June of 2004, Congress
passed the Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act,98
amending the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. Within the Act, Con-
gress mandated that:
The Director of [FEMA] shall, in cooperation with the in-
surance industry, State insurance regulators, and other in-
terested parties - (1) establish minimum training and
education requirements for all insurance agents who sell
flood insurance policies; and (2) not later than six months
after the date of enactment of this Act, publish these re-
quirements in the Federal Register, and inform insurance
companies and agents of the requirements.99
As of the April 2005 testimony before a subcommittee of the U.S
House of Representatives, FEMA estimated that it would be after October
2005 before it had fully complied with the mandates, nearly a year behind
schedule and one month after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. 00 Ac-
cording to one FEMA official, the Agency was still in the "planning stages
of meeting the requirement" and had not yet developed an action plan."o1
Yet, while it seems that violation of the above provisions places some liabil-
ity upon FEMA, the agency has the right to review claims against a private
insurer.10 2 Cases involving agent or insurer negligence are considered
93. Lovett v. Bradford, 676 So. 2d 893, 895 (Miss. 1996).
94. Id. (See Palmer v. Anderson Infirmary Benevolent Ass'n, 656 So. 2d 790, 795 (Miss. 1995);
M.R.E. 702).
95. McKinnon v. Batte, 485 So. 2d 295, 297 (Miss. 1986).
96. National Flood Insurance Program; Oversight of Policy Issuance and Claims: Before the Sub-
comm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, of the House Comm. on Financial Services, 109th
Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of William o. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Secur-
ity and Justice Issues).
97. Id at 4.
98. Pub. L. No. 108-264, § 1(a), 118 Stat. 712 (2004).
99. Pub. L. No. 108-264, § 207, 118 Stat. 712, 727 (2004) (amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 4011).
100. Hearings, supra note 96, at 4 (statement of William o. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Se-
curity and Justice Issues).
101. Id. at 11.
102. 44 C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A Art. III(D)(3)(a) (2008).
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outside the scope of the National Flood Insurance Act and are therefore
not attributable to FEMA.'03
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company's Appeal
The appeal brought by Nationwide was an obvious signal to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals that Nationwide had foreseen the issue of agent
misrepresentation, in the instant case and "hundreds of cases in the trial
courts," potentially causing Nationwide to "incur considerable litigation ex-
pense and potential enormous liability to other policyholders."' 04 The ap-
peal questions the trial court's ruling regarding the ambiguity of the
"ACC" clause of Leonard's insurance policy, 0 5 and the district court's res-
olution regarding Fletcher's alleged negligent misrepresentation. 0 6
Nationwide did not challenge the amount awarded to Leonard by the
trial court, 07 but focused their appeal primarily upon the evidentiary ruling
surrounding the alleged misrepresentations of its agent.'08 Nationwide ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to modify the holding of the
lower court in an effort to insulate itself from liability with regards to fu-
ture claims involving alleged misrepresentation or negligence on the part of
its agents and simultaneously estop future similar actions. The court of
appeals determined that the district court's findings as to the issue of negli-
gent misrepresentation and the threat of liability in future litigation ren-
dered Nationwide "sufficiently aggrieved" and thus entitled Nationwide to
this appeal.' 09
B. The Opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Chief Judge Edith H. Jones delivered the opinion of the court in Leo-
nard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., joined by Judges Reavley and
Smith. In an opinion which affirmed and criticized the holding of the trial
court, the court of appeals held (omitting the findings irrelevant to this
analysis) that Fletcher's alleged misrepresentations did not support Leo-
nard's claim of negligent misrepresentation, and that those misrepresenta-
tions did not amount to a valid modification of the policy."o While
addressing Leonard's claim of negligent misrepresentation, the court made
103. Id.
104. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 428.
105. Id. (This portion of the appeal is not relevant to the analysis in this Note).
106. Id. at 426.
107. Id. at 427 (The trial court denied Nationwide's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re-
garding Fletcher's oral statements, but held that Fletcher neither materially misrepresented policy
terms, nor did he "make any statements which could be reasonably understood to alter" the policy
terms.)
108. Id. at 427.
109. Id. (quoting Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1996)) ("A party may be ag-
grieved by a district court decision that adversely affects its legal rights or position vis-A-vis other par-
ties in the case or other potential litigants.")
110. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 440-42.
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three primary findings, based on analysis under contract and insurance
law.111
First, the court delivered its holding with regards to negligent misrep-
resentation concurrent with, as opposed to separate from, the issue of "oral
modification" of the policy.11 2 The court's holding is laced with the as-
sumption that the claim of negligent misrepresentation can and should be
analyzed in an "oral modification" context. Secondly, the Court analyzed
the allegations of negligent misrepresentation only as to the terms of Leo-
nard's existing homeowner's policy, rather than resulting from the agent's
answer to an inquiry about an entirely separate policy."1 ' Under this "oral
modification" analysis, the court held that Leonard's reliance on Fletcher's
statements were objectively unreasonable in light of the policy language of
his existing insurance contract.' 14
Still commingling the agency and contract based issues of "oral modifi-
cation" with the tort issue of negligent misrepresentation, the court held
that "even if the Leonards [could] satisfy the third element of apparent
authority-detrimental change in position-their misrepresentation claim
is stale," and thus time-barred."' The Court held that, pursuant to Title 15,
Chapter 1, Article 49 of the Mississippi Code, the statute of limitations for
bringing a claim of negligent misrepresentation was three years, and the
last conversation alleged between Leonard and Fletcher, having occurred
six years ago, in 1999, barred the claim."' Ultimately, the analysis by the
court rests upon the foundation that the negligent misrepresentation claim
could be properly dealt with using the general principles of agency, con-
tract, and insurance law.1 17
C. The Issues of Oral Modification of the Policy
and Negligent Misrepresentation
While the court found it "not at all clear whether the Leonards are
proceeding under a tort or contract theory," it asserts that "whether they
proceed under a misrepresentation theory or a contract-modification the-
ory, [they] lose on both scores."" The court held that neither theory
111. Id. at 439-41.
112. Id. at 440-42.
113. Id. at 425. ("Leonard called Fletcher after seeing advertisements FOR ADDITIONAL NFIP
COVERAGE in the wake of Hurricane George .. . . Fletcher allegedly assured Leonard that he did not
need additional flood coverage .... ) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 439-40.
115. Id. at 440.
116. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 441; see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1990); but see Neglin v.
Breazeale, 945 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 2006); Sarris v. Smith 782 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 2001); Flores v Elmer, 938
So. 2d 824 (Miss. 2006); 5 Ms. PRAc. ENC. § 44:21 (2007) (for the proposition that the 'Discovery Rule'
allows tolling of the statute until discovery of the misrepresentation).
117. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 440. ("Because the policy terms are unambiguous, the Leonard's claim
accrued at the time the misrepresentation was made.").
118. Id. at 439-40.
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should garner consideration because Fletcher's statements were "irrelevant
to interpreting this policy as a matter of Mississippi insurance law."1 19
Thus, in one fell swoop, the court simultaneously rejected both issues,
holding that Leonard's claim of negligent misrepresentation was not ac-
tionable primarily because Nationwide in no way indicated that Fletcher
had the authority to orally modify its insurance policies.12 0 Moreover, the
court held that Fletcher's oral statements did not support a negligent mis-
representation claim foregoing any analysis of the facts or evidence demon-
strating the existence of such a claim, specifically Fletcher's alleged
statements 121 and the method or manner of his advice. Giving no consider-
ation to potential liability issues arising under tort and agency law derived
from Fletcher's course of dealing with Leonard or the testimony of other
Nationwide policyholders advised by Fletcher, the Fifth Circuit held that
the district court abused its discretion by allowing into evidence Fletcher's
statements to other policyholders.12 2
D. The Finding of Abuse of Discretion Regarding the Admissibility of
Third Party Testimony and Various Oral Statements
Made by Fletcher
The district court acknowledged as fact that Fletcher not only repre-
sented that he did not carry NFIP coverage,123 but that he did so in the
course of assuring a client that they need not purchase the same supple-
mental flood coverage.124 The district court, citing testimony of various
witnesses, also found that Fletcher sometimes discouraged clients from
purchasing flood policies' 25 and concluded that there was ample evidence
to warrant the finding that Fletcher, when asked, as a matter of habit and
routine, expressed his opinion that customers should not purchase flood
insurance unless they lived in Flood Zone "A."126
The court recognized the fact that Fletcher had sold NFIP policies to
twelve residents of Leonard's neighborhood.127 Further, while noting that
Fletcher had nearly fifteen hundred customers (and sold less than two hun-
dred NFIP policies to those customers), 28 the Court found that the district
court was erroneous in their findings regarding Fletcher's statements to Le-
onard.129 Accordingly, the circuit court held that the lower court abused its
119. Id. at 140.
120. Id. at 441. (As the analysis will make apparent, the issue is whether Fletcher was negligent in
his advice as to an NFIP policy. Leonard's existing policy has nothing to do with this issue; nor can
Leonard's duty to read his existing policy immunize Fletcher.)
121. Id. (See, supra, note 60).
122. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 442.





128. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 442.
129. Id.
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discretion in considering evidence of statements made by Fletcher to other
policyholders under Federal Rule of Evidence 406.130
The court interpreted Rule 406's use of.the word "habit" as a "regular
response to a repeated situation" that has become "semi-automatic"'' and
held that the testimony surrounding Fletcher's comments to five other poli-
cyholders about the need for additional flood insurance "did not remotely
qualify or quantify as a habit within the meaning of Rule 406."132 Thus,
according to the circuit court, Fletcher's statements did not reveal an "inva-
riable, reflexive response to his treatment of inquiries about supplemental
flood insurance"133 and was thus inadmissible to demonstrate Fletcher's
routine practice of advising clients that they did not need to purchase addi-
tional flood policies under the NFIP program.
V. ANALYSIS
A. "It is Not at All Clear Whether the Leonard's are Proceeding
Under a Tort or Contract Theory."134
It would have served the Fifth Circuit well to address the fact that
when Leonard asked Fletcher about purchasing additional flood insurance,
Leonard was inquiring about coverage under an entirely different policy
than his existing homeowner's insurance. Recognition of this fact may very
well have influenced the court to examine the possibility of a tort analysis
and a reconsideration of both the lower court's admission of evidence and
its findings regarding that evidence. In the alternative, had Leonard clearly
plead a pure negligence claim, it may have eliminated the court's depen-
dence on contract-based "oral-modification" analysis.
The Fifth Circuit's holding included the finding that Leonard's claim of
negligent misrepresentation was not actionable primarily because Nation-
wide in no way indicated that Fletcher had the authority to orally modify
its insurance policies.13 5 Conversely, while Leonard's misrepresentation
claims may have lacked definition, the court could neither deny their exis-
tence nor hide its confusion.136 The court's uncertainty over adjudicating
the issue of negligence under the principals of contract or tort law'37 result
in a ruling which affirms that contract claims will not survive, but negli-
gence claims may have a future (having learned how not to plead such a
complaint).
There is no doubt that the agent lacked authority to orally modify Le-
onard's existing policy, yet absent a more specific analysis of tort issues,
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Reyes v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1979)); Fed. R. Evid. 406
permits evidence of the habit or other routine practice of an organization as relevant to prove that the
conduct of an organization in a particular instance was in conformity with that habit or routine practice.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 439.
135. Id. at 440.
136. Id. at 439.
137. Id. at 439; See also, supra, note 109.
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doubts remain as to Fletcher's potentially negligent 'opinion/possibly-ha-
bitual advice' regarding the need for NFIP policies. Furthermore, the fact
that the circuit court announces its confusion regarding which theory Leo-
nard attempted to present casts significant doubt on the ruling that the
district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence which supported
the tort claim of negligent misrepresentation.1 3 8
Consequently, while the disposition of the instant case effectively pro-
tects the insurer, it by no means precludes the future success of a properly
plead and substantiated negligence claim. Instead, both the district court
and Fifth Circuit rulings on Leonard suggest, at least implicitly, that agent
negligence may be actionable under different factual circumstances.139 Un
fortunately, in light of the nature of the complaint and the theories of re-
covery offered by Leonard, a discussion of tort liability, absent an express
tort claim, might have been construed as either an abuse of discretion or
judicial activism upon further review.
Nevertheless, whether the Fifth Circuit reasonably declined to recog-
nize a cause of action which was not specifically or sufficiently plead re-
mains arguable. Moreover, the circuit court undeniably exceeded the
scope of analysis upon review of the appeal. Nationwide asked for a ruling
only on the admissibility of evidence allowed by the district court. In re-
turn, the circuit court delivered a ruling which discussed both the admissi-
bility of such evidence, and the sufficiency of evidence required to recover
under tort theory. 14 0
B. Analyzing Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
Under Tort Theory
1. Agent Responsibility, the Nature of the Misrepresentation, and
Leonard's Reliance
As an insurance agent, Fletcher was held out by his principal as having
the express authority to represent Nationwide in the explanation of its pol-
icy coverages and to inform and advise about additional policies and pro-
tections.141  However, when the agent gave his opinion, it was not
138. See Pls.' Opp'n to Def.'s Mots. in Limine Seeking to Exclude Evidence, Leonard v. Nation-
wide Mutual Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (C.A. No. 1:05CV475LG-RHW). (Citing 1
McCormick on Evidence s197 (5th Ed.)) ("In cases alleging fraud or misrepresentation, proof that the
defendant perpetrated similar deceptions frequently is received into evidence."); see also, Br. of Appel-
lee/Cross-Appellants, Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (C.A. No.
06-61130), 2007 WL 402447 at 28, 29 (quoting Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330 at
339 (5th Cir., 1984)) ("Where 'a finding of fact is based on a misconception of the underlying legal
standard, an appellate court is not bound by the clearly erroneous standard of review."').
139. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 440 (In determining why the Leonard's misrepresentation claim is un
actionable, the court also implicitly demonstrates what might constitute actionable misrepresentation.)
140. See generally Leonard, 499 F.3d 419.
141. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 425 (When Leonard renewed their policy, they received this notice:
"Your policy does not cover flood loss. You can get protection through the National Flood Insurance
Program. If you wish to find out more about this protection, please contact your Nationwide agent.");
Leonard 438 F. Supp. 2d at 691 ("Fletcher was authorized by Nationwide to interpret and explain the
coverages provided under Nationwide's policies.").
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considered an "expert" or "professional" opinion for purposes of his prin-
cipal's liability regarding the reliance of the clients upon statements of the
agent made in his authorized capacity. This is surely an injustice.
The quality and competence of the agent's opinion and advice and the
due diligence upon which he bases that opinion or advisement (given his
express knowledge, or such imputed by his authority), be they reckless,
negligent or well-informed, are the factors which must be weighed in deter-
mining a breach of the standard of care. Leonard specifically asked
Fletcher about purchasing supplemental NFIP coverage in the wake of
Hurricane Georges.14 2 Fletcher's "professional" advice - his opinion as an
agent of the principal authorized to write such policies - was sought.
Fletcher was solicited by an existing policyholder about potentially
purchasing an entirely different policy (which, incidentally, renders irrele-
vant any analysis based on Fletcher's oral modification of the existing
homeowner's policy). Finally, insurance agents routinely advise customers
on whether or not to purchase certain policies. Thus when an agent pro-
vides incorrect, incomplete, and unsubstantiated information or advice,
that agent is wrong.'43
The agent had advised clients about and sold NFIP policies before. As
the Fifth Circuit noted, Fletcher had one hundred eighty seven NFIP cus-
tomers in the Pascagoula area. Moreover, the agent sold twelve flood poli-
cies to residents of Leonard's neighborhood," just two hundred yards
from the Gulf of Mexico.'45 Yet Fletcher advised Leonard not to purchase
an NFIP policy due to the fact that his home was not located in flood zone
"A,"146 despite the fact that Leonard's neighborhood is predominantly des-
ignated as flood zone "A."'4 7 Regardless of the agent's qualifications or
reasoning, Fletcher owed Leonard the duty of "reasonable care."1' Such
care is defined as "the degree of care that a prudent and competent person
engaged in the same line of business . . . would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances."' 49 Black's Law Dictionary subsequently provides that "pru-
dent" describes someone who is "circumspect or judicious in one's
dealings; cautious." 50 Moreover, one who is "competent" is defined as
"well-qualified; capable; fit.""'
Yet the alleged statements made to Leonard and other policyholders,
even the impression of Fletcher's attitude and diligence in providing ad-
vice, demonstrate a carelessness so arbitrary and capricious (words often
142. Id.
143. Insurance Litigation Reporter, 29 No 16 INSLITREP 634 (9/20/07).
144. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
145. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 423.
146. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
147. See FEMA NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE RATE MAP, CITY OF PASCAGOULA, MS, Panel 5 (Rev.
1984).
148. See generally supra notes 73-76.
149. BLACK'S LAW DIcrlONARY (8th ed. 2005).
150. Id.
151. wEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICrIONARY (4th ed. 2004).
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used to measure abuse of discretion) as to flirt with recklessness with re-
spect to the interests of both Leonard and Nationwide. An off-the-cuff
'opinion' advising clients that they do not need flood coverage seems
neither prudent nor competent, especially given the flood zone information
available, the proximity of Leonard's property to the Gulf of Mexico, and
the purpose of the NFIP.
Would Fletcher's opinion change upon realizing that from 1996-2006 a
total of seventeen named storms either threatened or made landfall along
the Mississippi Gulf Coast?1 12 What if he were told that six of the most
destructive hurricanes on record, all occurring since 1969, were in that
group?1 53 Is it reasonable, prudent, or simply good business practice to
know these facts and use them to formulate an informed opinion? Might
the district court and circuit court have ruled differently on the evidence
presented?
One cannot reasonably deny that consideration of the evidence or
mere common sense 15 4 suggests that Fletcher, by virtue of his actual au-
thority15 5 or purported expertise, should have had something more prudent
and competent to offer when approached about the sale of an insurance
policy.156 The fact that Fletcher had express knowledge that Leonard
sought advice as to an additional NFIP policy only reinforces such a
sentiment.
Yet Fletcher advised Leonard that his existing policy would cover hur-
ricane-related loss, and that Leonard did not need to purchase an addi-
tional flood policy. While Mississippi law clearly states that Fletcher is not
liable for misrepresentations regarding the existing policy, which Leonard
should have read, the law requires more of an agent who gives poor advice
that is subsequently relied upon.1 5 1 Thus, the true issue before the court is
not one of oral modification, but rather, whether a manifestation of negli-
gence in the insurance agent's advice or opinions to a client regarding ac-
quiring NFIP coverage constitutes actionable misrepresentation.15 8
Leonard sought out his long-time insurance agent to inquire about an
additional flood policy. Fletcher told Leonard that he did not need to
purchase one. Leonard, relying upon the agent's advice, refrained from
buying NFIP coverage. Having no way to read the policy himself, and tak-
ing the agent's erroneous opinion as a prudent and competent one, Leo-
nard's reliance upon Fletcher's statements is indeed reasonable.
152. The National Hurricane Center Archive of Hurricane Seasons, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
pastall.shtml (last visited Nov. 2007).
153. Eric S. Blake et al., Report, The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical
Cyclones From 1851 to 2006, National Weather Service (NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-5)
(April 2007).
154. McPherson, 221 So. 2d at 79.
155. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d at 1180.
156. Christ Methodist Episcopal Church, 615 So. 2d at 573.
157. Jimerson, 2006 WL 2192655 at *2; Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 319.
158. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d at 1180; Dixie Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d at 583; McFar-
land, 919 So. 2d at 902.
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2. The Responsibility and Subsequent Liability of FEMA and Private
Insurers
The selling of NFIP policies is carried out by private sector insurance
agents who either work independently or are employed by insurance com-
panies. 159 Agents, prior to Hurricane Katrina, were not required to com-
plete training or demonstrate a basic level of knowledge regarding the
NFIP.16 0 Meanwhile, flood program managers for the insurance companies
who write and sell policies under the NFIP have expressed concern about
the varying levels of knowledge that agents have regarding flood
policies. 161
FEMA and the insurance companies claim that they support agents
selling the NFIP policies in the form of training, customer service hotlines,
rate quote development, and web sites.162 However, other than requiring
agents to meet state licensing requirements, historically agents have not
been required to complete training or demonstrate a basic level of knowl-
edge regarding the NFIP.16 3
Some jurisdictions have found that FEMA has immunity in regards to
claims of agent negligence.1 64 Others, including the Fifth Circuit, have
reached different conclusions.' 6 5 In fact, courts have recognized that insur-
ance companies issuing NFIP policies are, by statute, fiscal agents of the
United States.166 Consequently, a claim brought against an insurer for the
acts of its agent may arguably bind FEMA,167 regardless of a determination
as to the agency's statutory negligence. 68 Private insurers, of course, are
not so lucky to be provided a statutory safe harbor. As discussed above in
Section III (E) (4), Mississippi law clearly holds the principal liable for the
tortious conduct of agents acting within the scope of their employment.' 9
C. The True Errors of the Leonard Cases
The circuit court's finding of error in the district court's evidentiary
findings remains questionable. If the Fifth Circuit concedes that it is una-
ble to determine whether the Leonards' sought a remedy in contract or in
159. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program; Oversight of Policy Issuance and Claims: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, House Comm. on Financial Servs., 190th Cong. 1
(2005).
160. Id.
161. Blake et al., supra note 153, at 7.
162. Blake et al., supra note 153, at 7.
163. Blake et al., supra note 153, at 7.
164. See generally supra notes 100-01; See also Scherz v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 112 F.Supp.2d
1000, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
165. See Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Van Holt v. Liberty Mutual,
163 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1998).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 4071 (1968); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964) (repealed).
167. Neill v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 159 F. Supp. 2d 770, 774 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
168. See supra note 97; supra note 98.
169. Hutton v. American General Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 909 So. 2d 87, 96 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Odier v. Sumrall, 353 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1978)).
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tort, finding abuse of discretion in admitting evidence establishing misrep-
resentation seems somewhat contradictory. The true error, one which
could hardly have been avoided due to the lack of jurisprudence, 70 oc-
curred in the findings of fact and consequently, the theories upon which
Leonard was adjudicated. Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, issues not raised in pleading tried expressly
or impliedly shall be treated as if they are in the pleadings.
Accordingly, it was error on the part of the district court in not dis-
missing insufficient tort claims1 7 2 or requiring that pleadings be amended
or further discovery propounded in the interest of justice and fairness
before adjudicating such claims under any theory. Similarly, it was error on
the part of the Circuit Court to deliver an evidentiary ruling concerning
those very tort claims when such a ruling rests on the foundation of a con-
tract which never existed.
Applying tort law to cases which straddle the fence between contract
and tort, while difficult, is nonetheless necessary. Leonard demonstrates
precisely why there is a need for tort analysis in similar factual scenarios:
Plaintiffs simply have no remedy otherwise. Admittedly, the applicable
standard of care may vary based on the knowledge of agent, the agent's
awareness of risks of which the customer is unaware, and the degree to
which the customer relies on the advice of an agent. 73 Further, Mississippi
case law provides little authority concerning the scope of the agent's re-
sponsibility to alert customers to risks in light of the agent's knowledge of
the risks covered by various policies.'74
However, under Mississippi law, an agent (and vicariously, the princi-
pal) who gives advice "concerning the coverages an insured should
purchase in circumstances where the advice is reasonably relied upon by
the prospective insured""' incurs liability if "the advice is the product of a
failure on the part of the agent to exercise reasonable care.""'7 Accord-
ingly, the finding that, in the absence of evidence of a standard of care,
Fletcher did not breach a duty owed to the Leonards cannot stand. The
standard of care exists independent from an affirmative showing of it. Mis-
sissippi courts have determined that these are matters for a layman to de-
termine, based on common sense and practical experience. 7
Given the above, the finding that Fletcher's opinion did not constitute
negligent misrepresentation, and though made under circumstances in
which it was foreseeable that they might be relied upon, that reliance upon
his advice was unreasonable given the language of the existing policy
170. Carter v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2359044 *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2006).
171. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2).
172. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
173. Carter, 2006 WL 2359044 at *2.
174. Id.
175. Jimmerson, 2006 WL 2192655 at * 2.
176. Id.
177. Lovett, 676 So. 2d at 895.
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should be found similarly erroneous. Similarly, attempting to analyze the
case under contract theory alone just does not satisfy.
Allowing Nationwide, perhaps even FEMA, to avoid liability for the
negligent conduct of its agent by hiding behind the absence of vagueness or
ambiguity in Leonard's existing homeowner's policy smacks of unfairness.
Leonard, after all, revolves around the advice given by a fully authorized
agent regarding whether or not to purchase an entirely different policy and
the reasonableness of relying on such advice. A contract dispute the in-
stant case simply is not.
D. The Significance of Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
1. Nationwide's Attempt to Avoid Liability Inherent Under Agency
Principles Backfires
Intriguingly, it was not Leonard, but Nationwide which brought this
appeal.17 8 The goal was blatantly pronounced: Nationwide sought to avoid
future litigation based on the potentially negligent statements of it
agents.179 While the ploy proved successful in the instant case, the results
of employing this tactic may prove increasingly more damaging in future
litigation. Taking issue with an evidentiary ruling, which given the facts at
hand had no significant effect on the ruling of the lower court, appears to
have at least loosened the lid on Pandora's Box. While Nationwide avoids
liability for now, the Fifth Circuit opinion makes clear exactly what will not
support a claim of negligent misrepresentation, which in turn presents fu-
ture litigants with a better idea of what will.
2. Removal Creates Valid Federal Jurisdiction for a State Court Issue
The procedural details of Leonard create quite the conundrum. Tacti-
cally, a defendant like Nationwide would normally relish a hearing in fed-
eral court. State courts have regularly proven more sympathetic to
plaintiffs, especially in this context. 180 Now however, the removal of Leo-
nard has led to a federal court ruling regarding the viability of a negligence
claim against an alleged agent-tortfeasor and a non-diverse claimant. This
ruling, although favorable to the defendant in the instant case, endangers
the traditional 'safe harbor' defendant insurers have enjoyed in federal
courts.
Further, as Leonard noted in moving to dismiss the non-diverse
Fletcher, because Mississippi law clearly binds the principal in such circum-
stances, the federal courts may soon become, through the binding effect of
the agent-principal relationship, just as plaintiff-friendly as state courts.
Leonard suggests that a well-plead action in negligence, initially brought
178. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 427.
179. Id. at 428.
180. It is important to acknowledge that the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi is located in Gulfport, Mississippi, an area also devastated by Hurricane Katrina, and it
would be ridiculous to suggest that the recent opinions from the District Court have been unilaterally
favorable towards defendant insurance companies or their agents.
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against a non-diverse co-defendant, might be equally damaging to the prin-
cipal insurance companies upon dismissal of the agent and removal to fed-
eral Court.
3. Nationwide's Fears Regarding Future Liability for Negligence May
Soon Be Realized
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Missis-
sippi (and subsequently the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) held that, al-
though Fletcher's alleged statements were not actionable given the facts of
this case, Leonard-and presumably future plaintiffs-could state a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim as a matter of law.18 ' The circuit court ruling
damages defendant insurance companies in two ways.
First, rather than extinguishing the possibility of future tort claims, the
court recognizes that there may indeed come a factual scenario where a
tort claim, properly plead and proven, will succeed. Secondly, instead of
concluding with a district court ruling which was generally favorable to de-
fendant insurers and would serve only as a persuasive ruling in federal
courts, Nationwide is left with Fifth Circuit precedent which all but invites
plaintiffs to present sufficient facts and evidence to support a tort claim.
Dicta or not, this precedent need not carry any weight in future cases. This
precedent need not be cited, but rather, it need only be followed as a road
map or recipe for preparing a successful tort claim.
D. The Implications of Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
1. The Plaintiff Insureds
Commingling tort and contract claims in Leonard results in incomplete
justice regarding their tort claims. Consequently, future plaintiffs gain a
clearer understanding of how an actionable tort claim might be brought
and how contract-based analysis may be avoided. Plaintiffs must first plead
the case properly, thereby avoiding evidentiary problems such as those in
Leonard. In fact, admission of the evidence, found to be an abuse of dis-
cretion in the instant case, will prove essential in proving tort claims.
Plaintiffs must demonstrate, according to the ruling in the instant case,
the existence of a standard of care. Further, plaintiffs are required to
demonstrate a breach of that standard of care. Moreover, they must be
able to prove reasonable reliance and actual damages resulting from the
breach and subsequent reliance. Most significantly, however, plaintiffs
should remain mindful of the conflict between tort and contract theory and
the court's predisposition to contract analysis.
Leonard alerts plaintiffs to the confusion and discomfort with which
the court handles a claim that doesn't fit neatly into a purely contract or
tort context. Leonard also demonstrates the inequity of judicial resolution
when analysis depends upon consideration of multiple areas of law. While
181. Brief of the Appellant at 11, Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., No. 06-61130,
2007 WL 4024474 (5th Cir. Jan. 30. 2007).
224 [VOL. 28:203
LEONARD V. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INS. CO.
disheartening in the instant case, future plaintiffs now realize the impor-
tance of demonstrating an independent tort in any context which might be
construed as a contract dispute.
In the end, Leonard should never have been plead as a contract claim
given the pivotal issue of negligent advisement as to an insurance policy
which had not yet been purchased. Consequently, plaintiffs must realize
not only the shortcomings of their pleadings, but the court's unwillingness
to explore the intricacies of a tort claim where a ruling based on contract
law is even remotely (and in the instant case, erroneously) available. Con-
sequently, Leonard will likely encourage plaintiffs to seek their remedy
purely in tort, rather than continue to be impeded by the more stoic con-
texts of contract law.
2. The Defendant Insurers
Alternatively, the ruling might also be viewed as a shot across the bow
of private insurance companies, absolving them momentarily, yet encour-
aging reevaluation of future decisions regarding agent training and their
prospective relationship with and duty owed to those they insure. Regard-
less, Leonard signals the start of a new race towards, or away from, the
courthouse, with potential defendants in the driver's seat. Thus, the linger-
ing question remains: Will the result of the instant case compel change
within the insurance industry now, or will the necessary reforms come only
after future tort claims?
Nationwide, and indeed the entire insurance industry, should find no
comfort in the ruling of the Fifth Circuit. While attempting to snuff out the
issue of misrepresentation, Leonard instead demonstrates its potential vi-
tality. Thus, insurers are faced with two options. First, they might simply
continue to take their chances in the courts. However, the better choice
might be to "self-insure" by formulating and implementing appropriate
training procedures.
One obvious alternative might require documentation of agent advice
given to insureds and potential insureds regarding the procurement of in-
surance. This would evidence the process and basis for the opinion, thus
providing a defense against a tort claim, assuming such documentation
would demonstrate that the opinion was one reached in a prudent and
competent manner. Regardless of what measures might be taken, these
potential future defendants control whether or not their agents might be
found in breach of the standard of care and ultimately whether or not they,
the principal insurers, end up in court.
3. The Courts and Public Policy
The tort issue so apparent in Leonard becomes the proverbial pink
elephant in the room while the court attempts to explain away the possibil-
ity of recovery under contract (a contract that in fact never existed; Leo-
nard never bought it because Fletcher advised him not to). Courts must
become as comfortable and adept at recognizing and allowing recovery for
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torts occurring under the veil of contract as they are in recognizing a con-
tract remedy despite overtones of a tort claim. The errors of Leonard
might remind the courts of the goals of such tort litigation: compensating
the injured and deterring conduct contrary to justice and public policy. The
instant case should also exemplify, to both the courts and the public, the
struggles facing the courts in the administration of justice amidst admitted
confusion regarding the application of competing legal theories.
Likewise, the judiciary must begin to concern itself with the problems
of strict contract and tort characterization. In determining the appropriate
analysis and the preclusion of another, the Leonard court seems to choose
form over fairness. Moreover, this breakdown allowed for the under-de-
velopment of viable tort claims to persist through trial and appeal, finally
dismissing them altogether as insignificant to the analysis of the facts under
principals of contract.
At what point must it be demanded that fairness override form, and
when should courts require, sua sponte or by amendment of pleadings, an
examination of all potential theories of recovery? Is this not already the
function of the courts? Can justice permit the dismissal of tort-related
claims in a contract-based ruling, or does an overarching interest in com-
pensating the injured require that those issues be tried fully and separately,
apart from any contract analysis?
Likewise, at what point do public policy and the interest of the individ-
ual citizen compel change in the judiciary? Leonard should serve as a high-
water mark in the contract-tort debate, a point at which both the public and
the courts decry the misuse of contract theory in order to avoid an analysis
under tort theory. Never again should a party whose only means of recov-
ery may lie in a muddled pleading of tort and contract claims be denied
such recovery in tort simply because contract theory is less ambiguous.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, Leonard cuts to the very heart of the conflict between tort and
contract analysis. In fact, the most important aspect of Leonard concerns
the botched attempt to handle a claim where tort and contract issues were
so intertwined. The fact that the circuit court announces its confusion re-
garding which theory the Leonards attempted to present casts significant
doubt on the ruling that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence which supported the tort claim of negligent misrepresentation,182
in turn calling into question the findings of fact regarding the issue of negli-
gence and their affirmation by the Fifth Circuit.
182. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motions in Limine Seeking to Exclude Evidence,
Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 438 F.Supp.2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (quoting 1 McCor-
mick on Evidence §197 (5th ed.). ("In cases alleging fraud or misrepresentation, proof that the defen-
dant perpetrated similar deceptions frequently is received into evidence."); See also, Brief of Appelleel
Cross-Appellants, Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-
61130) (quoting Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 339 (5th Cir., 1984)) ("Where 'a
finding of fact is based on a misconception of the underlying legal standard, an appellate court is not
bound by the clearly erroneous standard of review.')
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While the Leonards will not recover on their claim, Leonard v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co. provides a road map of sorts for future claim-
ants and a warning for future defendants. Plaintiffs should carefully
consider the strategy of their cases, the value of pleading precisely, the evi-
dence necessary to prevail, and most significantly, their choice of forum. In
doing so, they should not forget Leonard's most important lesson: the ten-
sion at the edges of tort and contract theory is a slippery slope. That slope
is one which the courts prefer not to walk on and regularly defer to con-
tract theory instead. Until courts become more comfortable in thinking
outside of the traditional contract - tort boxes, plaintiffs must distinguish
one from the other themselves, thus forcing the courts to address the issue
under both theories.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's responsibility, the courts have responsi-
bilities of their own and in Leonard, those responsibilities were not met.
The court cannot declare that it is not at all clear whether the Leonards are
proceeding under tort or contract theory and then claim to deliver justice
by dismissing the tort claim under contract theory. If it is not at all clear,
then clarity should be the first and only problem addressed, as it is reasona-
ble to render judgments on issues only after they have become sufficiently
defined. To do otherwise would lead to an erroneous application of law,
requiring reversal or remand.
Finally, to acknowledge the existence of potential tort claims, then find
inadmissible the very evidence which supports those claims cannot suffice.
The ruling is not only self-contradicting, it denies the plaintiff the ability to
bring a pure tort claim of negligent misrepresentation in the future, the
issue having been previously adjudicated under a contract-based analysis.
Justice and fairness require a complete analysis of all legal theories which
become obviously relevant to a court's decision, even when not specifically
plead."'s This is especially true of Leonard and other cases in which the
absence of such an analysis precludes current remedies under one theory
and simultaneously bars future recovery under another.18
183. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
184. The Leonard's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
was denied on April 14, 2008. (See 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008)).
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